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1 Introduction
As broadly defined by Galati and Moessner (2013), “macroprudential policy is seen
as aiming at financial stability”. This policy contributes to the stability of the finan-
cial system both in promoting measures that enhance the resilience of the financial
system and counteract the emergence of financial imbalances. If initially macropru-
dential actions have been associated with countercyclical capital requirements for
financial intermediaries, they now encompass a wider range of practices. Further-
more, since the recent financial crisis of 2007, macroprudential policies have been
considered as a natural complement to monetary policy actions to prevent and offset
the destabilizing consequences of financial fluctuations.
Besides the choice of adequate instruments, the definition of macroprudential
measures in European countries hinges on the balance that should be reached be-
tween national and federal concerns. As an integrated economic area, the Eurozone
as a whole should require a homogenous treatment for all participating countries.
Nevertheless, some remaining structural heterogeneities give rise to diverging finan-
cial cycles across Eurosystem participants, questioning the interest of lifting up this
policy to a federal level as monetary policy. Consequently, the conduct of macro-
prudential policy in the Euro Area should account for imperfections related to the
financial environment as well as asymmetries in the credit cycles between country
members.
Following the De Larosière (2009) report, countries belonging to the European
Union (and by so, the Eurozone) have adopted a federal organization for the con-
duct of macroprudential policies taking into account national heterogeneities. Cur-
rently, supervisory and regulatory frameworks remain fragmented along national
lines, while international coordination is achieved through the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB). This operational scheme is in sharp contrast to monetary policy
principles, as the Eurozone monetary stance only reacts to union-wide aggregates.
The aim of this paper is to quantify the welfare gains that could be obtained
within this institutional organization through a coordinated implementation of macro-
prudential policy tailored to national situations. We more particularly build and es-
timate a two-region DSGE model of the EMU that accounts for financial differences
between core and peripheral countries to determine how union-wide and regional
concerns should be balanced regarding the choice of both the financial variable to
be targeted and the value of the macroprudential policy parameters. Macropruden-
tial policy is introduced without microfoundations through a tax on corporate loans
which reacts to credit growth to dampen credit cycles.
Our analysis shares some common features with recent analyzes surveyed by
Loisel (2014). The analysis of Quint and Rabanal (2014) provides a natural point of
departure for this paper, as it develops a two-country DSGE model well suited to the
case of the Eurozone. Quint and Rabanal (2014) study the optimal policy mix needed
within a currency union, where country-specific boom and bust cycles cannot be di-
rectly addressed with monetary policy. Accounting for regional heterogeneities in
the Eurozone they find that the coordination of monetary and macroprudential poli-
cies stabilizes the effect of real and financial shocks to the macro-environment. Fo-
cusing on the interaction between financial and housing cycles, they find that macro-
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prudential policy leads to significant gains for households in terms of unconditional
consumption. Macroprudential policy is introduced through an ad hoc tax on housing
loans which aims at offsetting financial imbalances created by a financial accelerator
mechanism between impatient households and financial intermediaries. They also
find that there are no negative spillover effects of regulation from one member state
to another, so setting macroprudential policies at the regional or union-wide levels
will therefore not change the outcome.
This paper differs from Quint and Rabanal (2014) on three major aspects. First,
their model includes a financial accelerator mechanism on the household side, such
that changes in the balance sheet of borrowers due to house-price fluctuations affect
the spread between lending and deposit rates. In contrast, we focus on the produc-
tive side of the economy (namely firms and entrepreneurs) and consider the link
between investors and the banking system as the main channel for the build-up of
financial imbalances. In our setting, we assume that entrepreneurs’ optimism gives
rise to a financial accelerator phenomenon that amplifies the transmission of shocks
in the economy through the external finance premium. These biased expectations
lead entrepreneurs to default on their loans, creating an important inefficiency in
the economy. Second, we will not study the optimal policy mix between monetary
and macroprudential policies. Third, Quint and Rabanal (2014) limit their analysis
to macroprudential policy rules based on domestic loan developments. We take an-
other complementary focus by evaluating whether macroprudential policy should
react to regional or union-wide developments of the loan growth rate. Given the
synchronization of business cycles between EMU participants, reacting to union-
wide developments could be more effective in dampening financial cycles and avoid-
ing negative spillovers. In our setting, the individual treatment of each area in the
macroprudential action is assessed along two complementary dimensions related to
the variables to which policy reacts (union-wide or regional lending developments)
and to the policy stance (regional or uniform macroprudential parameter setting).
Our experiments confirm the findings of Quint and Rabanal (2014) in the sense that
the best outcome from macroprudential actions is obtained by reacting to regional
developments.
The methodology employed in this paper comprises three steps: (i) we estimate
a two-region DSGE model for the Euro Area with only monetary policy (as there are
no observations for an estimation of a macroprudential rule); (ii) we compute the op-
timal policy rules (both monetary and macroprudential policy) given the estimated
parameters assuming a two-stage game where monetary policy is the leader; (iii)
we compare the welfare implications of having homogenous versus heterogeneous
macroprudential rules across regions of the Eurosystem using the optimal Taylor rule
as our benchmark reference.1
Our main results clearly show that it is always preferable, from the point of view
of the union, to make the macroprudential instruments react to regional develop-
ments. In particular, we find that in this case macroprudential measures lead to
1We are aware that a limitation of our approach lies in the fact that the estimated model does not
include macroprudential policy and is then different from the optimal setup in which we compare
counterfactual macroprudential rules. However, this methodology is largely used in macropruden-
tial policy research papers (see for instance Darracq-Pariès et al. (2011); Quint and Rabanal (2014);
Angelini et al. (2014)).
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higher welfare gains at the Eurozone level representing 0.0372% of permanent con-
sumption instead of 0.0235% under macroprudential measures reacting to union-
wide developments. Thus, in terms of policy implications, our experiments reveal
that macroprudential policy should be adjusted to regional evolutions, confirming
the current institutional framework adopted in the Euro Area based on regional
macroprudential measures. However, the welfare gains obtained at the union-wide
level are unequally shared between participating countries. We find that peripheral
countries are the main winners in the conduct of macroprudential policy while wel-
fare improvements are rather limited for core countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The following two sections sketch the model:
section 2 presents the private sector and section 3 the policy organization and the
general equilibrium of the model. section 4 presents the data, the econometric ap-
proach and reports the estimates. section 5 discusses the welfare consequences of
alternative governance schemes for macroprudential measures. section 6 concludes.
2 The private sector
The general structure of the model is depicted in Figure 1. The Eurozone is presented
as a two-country DSGE model made of two asymmetric areas i ∈ {c, p} (where c is
for core and p for periphery parts) of relative sizes nc and np. The size of each sector is
normalized to 1. Each part of the monetary union is populated by consumers, inter-
mediate and final producers, entrepreneurs, capital suppliers and a banking system.
Each economy is populated by households, intermediate and final firms, entrepreneurs
and a banking system. Households consume final goods and supply labor to firms.
The intermediate sector produces intermediate goods that are combined by final
firms to become final goods. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), entrepreneurs bring to
intermediates firms the physical capital involved in the production process of goods.
The entrepreneur is a key agent to introduce financial frictions as it contracts loans to
financial intermediaries and can endogenously default on its loans.
Monetary
Policy
Macroprudential
Policy
Bank
Bank
Production
Production
Household
Household
Cc,t
Cp,t
Lsc,t
Lsp,t
Investment
Flows
Consumption
Flows
Reﬁnancing
Rate Rt
Credit Growth
Tax
Deposits Ddc,t
Deposits Ddp,t
Figure 1: The model of a two-country monetary union
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This section describes the private sector of the economy, by distinguishing the
standard components of the DSGE setting (consumers and firms) from the financial
component of the analysis (entrepreneurs, banks and capital suppliers).2
2.1 The standard part of the model
Households
The representative household maximizes his utility intertemporally subject to a bud-
get constraint. The welfare index Wi,t reads as: ∑∞τ=0βτ exp(εUi,t+τ)U (Ci,t+τ, Hi,t+τ).
Here, Ci,t is the consumption, Hi,t is labor effort, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount
factor and εUi,t is an exogenous shock to time-preferences. The period utility function
takes the form:
U (Ci,t, Hi,t) ≡ 1
(1− σCi )
(Ci,t − hCi Ci,t−1)1−σ
C
i − χi
(1+ σHi )
H1+σ
H
i
i,t , (1)
where σHi ≥ 0 is the curvature coefficient in the disutility of labor, σCi ≥ 0 is the
risk aversion coefficient and hCi ∈ [0; 1) are external consumption habits. The budget
constraint reads as, Wi,tHi,t +(1+RDi,t−1)D
d
i,t +Πi,t = P
C
i,tCi,t +D
d
i,t+1 + Ti,t + Pi,t AC
D
i,t.
The income of the representative household is made of labor income (with nominal
wage, Wi,t), interest payments for deposits (where Ddi,t stands for deposits subscribed
in period t − 1 and 1 + RDi,t−1 is the gross nominal rate of interest between period
t− 1 an period t), and earnings Πi,t from shareholdings of intermediate firms. The
representative household spends this income on consumption, deposits and tax pay-
ments (for a nominal amount of Ti,t). In addition to close the model, we assume that
the household has to pay quadratic adjustment costs ACDi,t (j) to buy new deposit
services and holds a constant real quantity of money balances M¯i.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each producing differen-
tiated goods using hours of work Hi,t and capital inputs Ki,t and set production prices
Pi,t according to the Calvo model. Output supplied by firms is Yi,t = exp(εAi,t)K
α
i,tH
1−α
i,t
where εAi,t is an innovation to the productivity and α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of cap-
ital services in the production. According to the Calvo mechanism, each period
firms are not allowed to re-optimize the selling price with probability θPi but price
increases of ξPi ∈ [0, 1] at last period’s rate of price inflation, Pi,t = pi
ξPi
i,t−1Pi,t−1 where
pii,t = Pi,t/Pi,t−1. Under this setting, it is possible to derive the aggregate inflation
rate of production goods, it is defined by the function, pii,t = f (Etpii,t+1,pii,t−1, MCi,t)
where MCi,t is the marginal cost of production.
2A detailed presentation of the framework is provided in appendix.
5
2.2 Financial frictions
In this setting, financial frictions occur because investment in new capital assets
should be financed. The return of investment projects financed by entrepreneurs
is heterogeneous and leads entrepreneurs to default on their loans when the return
of capital is set too low compared to the cost of credit. In what follows, we present in
some details the problem faced by the entrepreneur (that takes the decision to finance
new investments) and sketch the programs of the banking sector and the capital sup-
pliers.
Entrepreneurs
Qi,tKi,t+1 = Ni,t+1 + Li,t+1
Capital Suppliers
Qi,tKi,t = f(It,Ki,t−1)
Banks
Li,t
Goods Producers
Yi,t = f(Ki,t, Hi,t)
Uncertainty ω on capital
rentability : risky for Entre-
preneurs
_Loans_
Li,t+1
New Capital
Qi,tKi,t+1
Ki,t
Figure 2: Financial frictions through the introduction of an entrepreneur which fi-
nances capital services using its net wealth and industrial loans
Figure 2 depicts the relations between financial intermediaries, entrepreneurs and
firms. As the entrepreneur is at the center of the analysis, we first single out the
decisions of this agent, then we provide a compact presentation of capital suppliers
and of financial intermediaries.3
Entrepreneurs
In each economy, the representative entrepreneur i finances the capital renting of in-
termediate firms. Each intermediate firm and entrepreneur belong to the same busi-
ness i. In period t, entrepreneur i conducts a great number of heterogeneous projects
with total value Qi,tKi,t+1 (i), where Qi,t is the price of capital and Ki,t+1 (i) is the
amount of capital financed. These projects are financed by his net wealth and by
loans from the banking system (Ldi,t+1 (i)). The balance sheet of the representative
entrepreneur is determined by:
Qi,tKi,t+1 (i)− Ni,t+1 (i) = LHi,t+1 (i) , (2)
where LHi,t+1 (i) = L
d
i,t+1 (i)− hLi (Ldi,t− Ldi ) denotes external demand habits for loans.4
The investment projects undertaken by the entrepreneur are risky and differ with
respect to their individual returns and allow entrepreneurs to default on its loans
3More details are provided in appendix.
4These lending demand habits are deemed necessary to replicate the dynamic of loans. In the es-
timation exercise, we use the total stock of loans, they are of different maturities implying a strong
autocorrelation. Simply by introducing loan demand habits, taking into account the high autocorre-
lation of loans becomes tractable easily and does not change the steady state of the model.
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for its least profitable projects. To model individual riskiness, we assume that each
project has an individual return equal to ω(1+ Rki,t), i.e. that the aggregate return of
investment projects in the economy 1+Rki,t is multiplied by a random value ω (drawn
from a Pareto distribution).5 Defining the value for a profitable project by ω¯i,t =
E
(
ω|ω ≥ ωCi,t
)
(where ωCi,t is the critical value of ω that distinguishes profitable and
non-profitable projects), the profit function of entrepreneur i after aggregating all
projects becomes:
ΠEi,t (i) =
{
ω¯i,t+1
(
1+ Rki,t+1
)
Qi,tKi,t+1 (i)−
(
1+ RLi,t
)
LHi,t+1 (i) with probability η
E
i,t+1,
0 with probability 1− ηEi,t+1,
.
(3)
where ηEi,t+1 is the time-varying expected share of profitable projects. Since entrepreneurs
cannot screen the value of ω¯i,t+1 ex ante, ωCi,t cannot be a control variable of the finan-
cial contract between borrowers and lenders contrary to Bernanke et al. (1999). To
introduce a financial accelerator mechanism, we borrow a concept of De Grauwe
(2010) applied in a different context, by assuming that entrepreneurs’ forecasts re-
garding the aggregate profitability of a given project ω¯i,t are optimistic (i.e., biased
upwards).6 The perceived ex ante value of profitable projects is defined by the CES
function:
g(ω¯i,t+1, ε
Q
i,t) = γi (ω¯i,t+1)
κi
(κi−1) (eε
Q
i,t)
1
(κi−1) ,
where εQi,t is an AR(1) process,
7 κi is the elasticity of the external finance premium
and γi is a scale parameter.8 In this expression, the exogenous shock is affected by
exponent 1/ (κi − 1) to normalize to unity the impact of the financial shock εQi,t in
the log deviation form of the model. Thus, ex-ante the entrepreneur chooses a capital
amount Ki,t+1 (i) that maximizes its expected profit defined as:
max
{Ki,t+1(i)}
Et
{
ηEi,t+1
[
g
(
ω¯i,t+1, ε
Q
i,t
) (
1+ Rki,t+1
)
Qi,tKi,t+1 (i)−
(
1+ RLi,t
)
LHi,t+1 (i)
]}
.
(4)
Using the characteristics of the Pareto distribution, the expected spread required by
representative entrepreneur e to undertake the decision to finance firms’ investment
5With respect to the standard framework standardly used in the literature (Bernanke et al., 1999),
we assume that the heterogeneity in the return of investment project undertaken by firms is modeled
using a Pareto distribution as in Poutineau and Vermandel (2015a,b). This device commonly used in
other branches of the economic literature provides a series of interesting features in the analysis and
allows an easier estimation of the financial amplification effect.
6Assuming optimistic firms is motivated empirally, Bachmann and Elstner (2013) find evidence
of such expectations for German firms using microdata. This hypothesis of the expectations of the
private sector is very close to the utility functions introduced by Goodhart et al. (2005) for bankers. In
our setting, the financial accelerator does not result from a moral hazard problem but rather from a
bias in the expectations of the private sector.
7This shock affects the expected profitability of financial projects by rising in exogeneously the risk
premium implying an increase in the cost of capital and hence a reduction in investment as underlined
by Gilchrist et al. (2009b) for the US economy.
8This parameter is needed to make the steady state independent of κi ,such that γi = ω¯1/(1−κi).
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is:
Si,t (i) =
Et
(
1+ Rki,t+1
)
1+ RLi,t
= γκi−1i
[
κ
κ − 1
(
1− Ni,t+1 (i)
Qi,tKi,t+1 (i)
)]κi
eε
Q
i,t . (5)
The size of the accelerator is determined by the elasticity of the external finance pre-
mium κi. For κi > 0, the external finance premium is a positive function of the
leverage ratio, Qi,tKi,t+1 (i) /Ni,t+1 (i), so that an increase in net wealth induces a re-
duction of the external finance premium. This phenomenon disappears if κi = 0.
Concerning the exogenous movements of the external finance premium, a positive
realization of εQi,t means that entrepreneurs require a higher expected profitability of
capital EtRki,t+1 to finance investment for a given level of lending conditions R
L
i,t. Fur-
thermore, a shock that hits the entrepreneur net wealth Ni,t+1 (i) will also affect the
return of physical capital in the economy. As the rentability of capital is a cost for the
intermediate sector, a variation in the net wealth will have aggregate consequences
on goods supply through the channel of the capital market as underlined by Gilchrist
et al. (2009b). Thus the net wealth of the entrepreneur in the next period is equal to:
Ni,t+1 (i) =
(
1− τEi
) ΠEi,t (i)
eε
N
i,t
, (6)
where εNi,t is an exogenous process of net wealth destruction and τ
E
i is a proportional
tax on the profits.
Banks
The representative bank operates in a regime of monopolistic competition to provide
deposit and credit services to households and firms. Each period, the bank collects
deposits Di,t from households remunerated at a rate RDi,t (b), borrows funds L
RF
i,t for
a refinancing rate Rt from the central bank, and supplies loans Lsi,t to entrepreneurs
whose rate is RLi,t (b). Given the biased expectations of entrepreneurs, banks are not
able to distinguish between solvable and defaulting projects, in turn they face a credit
risk modelled by 1− ηEi,t+1 which is the expected rate of default of entrepreneurs. Al-
lowing bank to size back their loans in case of default, they must pay a proportional
audition cost µB ∈ [0, 1] which can also be interpreted as the loss-given-default. Its
expected one-period profits can be expressed as:
EtΠBi,t+1 (b) =
[
Etη
E
i,t+1 +
(
1− µB
) (
1− ηEi,t+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
credit default
(
1+ RLi,t (b)
)
Lsi,t+1 (b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loan supply revenues
(7)
− (1+ Rt) LRFi,t+1 (b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ECB refinancing cost
−
(
1+ RDi,t
)
Di,t+1 (b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deposit cost
,
which has to be optimized under the balance sheet constraint:
Lsi,t+1 (b) = Di,t+1 (b) + L
RF
i,t+1 (b) + BKi,t+1 (b) , (8)
where BKi,t+1 is the amount of equity hold by the bank.
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One of the key equations of the paper that will be affected by macroprudential
policy is the first order condition on commercial loans:
1+ MCLi,t =
(1+ Rt)[
1− µB
(
1−EtηEi,t+1
)] . (9)
Following Darracq-Pariès et al. (2011), we measure the pass-through of interest
rates by supposing that the representative bank sets the deposit and credit rates in
staggered basis à la Calvo. Letting θLi (θ
D
i ) denotes the country specific probability
of the bank not being able to reset it credit (deposit) interest rate. The aggregate
deposit rate reads as, RDi,t = f (EtR
D
i,t+1, Rt, ε
D
i,t) where ε
D
i,t is a markup shock and Rt
is the ECB refinancing rate. Similarly, the aggregate credit rate is defined by, RLi,t =
f (EtRLi,t+1, MC
L
i,t). Solving forward R
L
i,t, one can see that current and expected future
ECB rate Rt and firms’ profitability EtηEi,t+1 drive today’s credit rates.
Capital Suppliers
The representative capital producer buys depreciated capital stock (1− δ)Ki,t and
investment goods Ii,t and produces new capital goods Ki,t+1 at a price Qi,t. Capi-
tal supplier buys home and foreign investment goods, Ii,t = (
(
1− αIi
)1/µ I(µ−1)/µhi,t +(
αIi
)1/µ I(µ−1)/µf i,t )µ/(µ−1) where 1− αIi > 0.5 is the home bias in its consumption bas-
ket.
3 Policies and general equilibrium
This section describes the rest of the model, namely the behavior of authorities and
the general equilibrium conditions of the model.
3.1 Policies
As depicted in Figure 1, the conduct of macroeconomic policy is shared between a
common central bank and regional macroprudential authorities.
Monetary Policy
The central bank of the monetary union follows an interest rate rule defined by:
(
1+ Rt
1+ R¯
)
=
(
1+ Rt−1
1+ R¯
)ρ((
piCt
)φpi ( Yt
Yt−1
)φ∆y)(1−ρ)
eε
R
t , (10)
where Rt is the interest rate set by the central bank and R¯ its steady state, ρ is the
interest rate smoothing coefficient, εRt is an exogenous AR(1) monetary policy shock
common to the monetary union members, φpi is the level of reaction to inflation, φ∆y
9
is the GDP growth target. In this expression, union-wide inflation and GDP growth
are defined by a geometric average that account for the relative size of each country,
piCt = (pi
C
c,t)
n(piCp,t)
1−n and Yt = (Yc,t)n(Yp,t)1−n. In this paper we assume that the
central bank follows an optimal monetary policy, so the parameters of the Taylor rule
are chosen to maximize a second order approximation of household utility function
combined with the equilibrium conditions of the model.
Macroprudential Policy
Following Quint and Rabanal (2014), the macroprudential instrument (MP i,t) re-
acts to credit growth (Lsi,t/L
s
i,t−1). A tightening of credit conditions due to macro-
prudential measures increases the interest rate faced by borrowers by modifying the
marginal cost of loan production (MCLi,t). This macroprudential tool affects the credit
market conditions countercyclically to dampen credit cycles and provides macroeco-
nomic stabilization.
The general expression of the transmission channel can be understood simply by
taking into account that in our setting the interest rate on loans is determined by a
new Keynesian interest rate Phillips curve such that RLi,t = f (EtR
L
i,t+1, MC
L
i,t), where
the current marginal cost of loan production given in Equation 9 is directly affected
by the macroprudential instrumentMP i,t with a policy stance φi ≥ 0:
1+ MCLi,t =
(1+ Rt) (MP i,t)φi[
1− µB
(
1−EtηEi,t+1
)] . (11)
The macroprudential instrumentMP i,t is introduced in an ad-hoc fashion to af-
fect directly the cost of loan production (and thus their interest rate, RLi,t) through
a tax on refinancing from the central bank. The main difference between monetary
and macroprudential policy concerns the scope of their respective tools. As a main
difference with monetary policy, macroprudential policy does not affect the deposit
rate (and in turn households’ consumption) and allows to target directly the origin
of the financial imbalances. A macroprudential tightening here can be interpreted as
an internalization of the cost of over-borrowing from entrepreneurs because of their
biased expectations through a Pigouvian taxation as in Jeanne and Korinek (2010).
Extra-earnings generated by the taxation are kept by banks and accumulated in terms
of bank capital which enhances the resilience of the financial system.9 In addition, the
use of a country-adjusted macroprudential policy introduces more granularity that
a single monetary policy cannot offer for an heterogeneous monetary union such as
the Euro area.
Assuming that macroprudential actions are based upon the growth of loans, we
distinguish two possible schemes that can be either regional or union-wide:
MP i,t = Lsi,t/Lsi,t−1 or MP t =
(
Lsc,t/L
s
c,t−1
)n (Lsp,t/Lsp,t−1)1−n . (12)
9We focus on welfare-enhancing macroprudential policies directed toward borrowers. The stability
of lenders assessed by the bank capital, which is another key facet of macroprudential policy, is not in
the scope of the paper.
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Scenario Targeting rule Policy stance Policy Channel
(1) MP t =
(
Lsc,t/L
s
c,t−1
)n (
Lsp,t/L
s
p,t−1
)1−n
φc = φp = φ 1+ MCLi,t =
(1+Rt)(MP t)φ
[1−µB(1−EtηEi,t+1)]
(2) MP t =
(
Lsc,t/L
s
c,t−1
)n (
Lsp,t/L
s
p,t−1
)1−n
φc 6= φp 1+ MCLi,t = (1+Rt)(MP t)
φi
[1−µB(1−EtηEi,t+1)]
(3) MP i,t =
(
Lsi,t/L
s
i,t−1
)
for i ∈ {h, f } φc = φp = φ 1+ MCLi,t =
(1+Rt)(MP i,t)φ
[1−µB(1−EtηEi,t+1)]
(4) MP i,t =
(
Lsi,t/L
s
i,t−1
)
for i ∈ {h, f } φc 6= φp 1+ MCLi,t =
(1+Rt)(MP i,t)φi
[1−µB(1−EtηEi,t+1)]
Table 1: Different levels of implementation of Macroprudential policy
In addition, we also analyze the possibility for the policy stance φi to be homo-
geneously or heterogeneously between the two areas of the monetary union. Table 1
summarizes all the possible scenarios that our setup offers: we contrast four situ-
ations combining regional (MP i,t with i ∈ {c, p}) or union-wide (MP t) loan de-
velopments with either an uniform (φc = φp) or regional (φc 6= φp) setting of the
macroprudential reactivity parameter.
In Table 1, situation (1) assumes a uniform reaction of macroprudential policy to
global lending developments in the Eurozone, while at the other extreme, scenario
(4) assumes a granular policy combining a regional definition of both the reaction
variable and policy stance. Scenarios (2) and (3) are intermediate solutions. Policy
stance parameters are chosen to maximize the joint welfare of countries belonging
to the monetary union. As policy evaluation is based on the optimal decisions of
authorities, the value of parameters φi will be set by optimizing households’ welfare
index:
max
Ω
nWc,t + (1− n)Wp,t (13)
whereΩ is the set of policy parameters to be optimally chosen. We employ perturba-
tion methods taking a second order approximation to the full model which provides
an accurate evaluation of the welfare criterion to rank and compare different policies.
3.2 Aggregation and general equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the model is obtained after (i) aggregating all agents and
varieties in the economy, (ii) imposing market clearing for all markets, and (iii) sub-
stituting the relevant demand functions. In this model, there are 7 country specific
structural shocks for i ∈ {h, f } and one common shock in the Taylor rule. For
s = {U, A, I, Q, N, D}, the shocks follow a first order autoregressive process such
that εsi,t = ρ
s
i ε
s
i,t−1 + η
s
i,t while for exogenous spending the process reads as follows:
εGi,t = ρ
G
i ε
G
i,t−1 + η
G
i,t + ρ
agηAi,t. In these first-order autoregressive process, ρ
U
i , ρ
A
i , ρ
G
i ,
ρIi , ρ
Q
i , ρ
N
i , ρ
D
i and ρ
R are autoregressive roots of the exogenous variables. ηUi,t, η
A
i,t,
ηGi,t, η
I
i,t, η
Q
i,t, η
N
i,t, η
D
i,t and η
R
t are standard errors that are mutually independent, seri-
ally uncorrelated and normally distributed with zero mean and variances σ2i,U, σ
2
i,A,
σ2i,G, σ
2
i,I , σ
2
i,Q, σ
2
i,N, σ
2
i,D and σ
2
R respectively. A general equilibrium is defined as a
sequence of quantities {Qt}∞t=0 and prices {Pt}∞t=0 such that for a given sequence of
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quantities {Qt}∞t=0 and the realization of shocks {St}∞t=0, the sequence {Pt}∞t=0 guar-
antees the equilibrium on the capital, labor, loan, intermediate goods and final goods
markets..
On the goods Market, the aggregate price index of the national goods evolves
according to:
P1−ePi,t = θ
P
i
[
Pi,t−1
(
Pi,t−1
Pi,t−2
)ξPi ]1−eP
+
(
1− θPi
) (
P∗i,t
)1−eP . (14)
The equilibrium condition on the final goods market is defined by the aggregation of
the demand function from final goods producers, G(Yi,t (i)) = Ydi,tG(Pi,t(i)/Pi,t)−eP
where G(Yi,t (i)) = exp(εAi,t)G(Ki,t (i)α Hdi,t (i)1−α) is the aggregation of intermediate
goods suppliers and Ydi,t is the resources constraint. Thus, replacing the demand func-
tions of foreign and home goods (consumption and investment), we finally obtain the
home final goods market equilibrium in the home country:
Yc,t
∆Pc,t
=
(
1− αCc
)(Pc,t
PCc,t
)−µ
Cc,t +
(
1− αIc
)(Pc,t
PIc,t
)−µ (
1+ ACIc,t
)
Ic,t (15)
+
n− 1
n
αCp
(
Pc,t
PCp,t
)−µ
Cp,t + αIp
(
Pc,t
PIp,t
)−µ (
1+ ACIp,t
)
Ip,t

+ Gc,t + ACDc,t,
where ∆Pi,t = G(Pi,t (i) /Pi,t)−eP denotes the price dispersion term, which is induced
by the assumed nature of price stickiness, is inefficient and entails output loss. To
close the model, adjustment costs on deposits are entirely home biased: ACDi,t =
G(ACDi,t (i)(eP−1)/eP)eP/(eP−1), the associated demand function is, ACDi,t (i) = (Pi,t (i) /Pi,t)−eP ACDi,t.
Concerning the equilibrium on the loan market, it is defined by the aggregate de-
mand function from retail banks: G(Lsi,t+1 (b)) = ∆Li,tLdi,t+1, where∆Li,t = G(RLi,t (b) /RLi,t)−eL
is the credit rate dispersion term and Ldi,t+1 is the aggregate demand. The aggregate
loan rate index evolves according to:(
RLi,t
)1−eL
= θLi
(
RLi,t−1
)1−eL
+
(
1− θLi
) (
RLi,t
)1−eL
. (16)
Eventually the equilibrium on the deposit market is defined by the aggregate
demand for deposit services of households and the aggregate supply from deposit
packers. Aggregating the demand function from deposit packers leads to the equilib-
rium on this market: G(Di,t+1 (b)) = ∆Di,tG(Ddi,t+1 (j)), where∆Di,t = G((RDi,t (b) /RDi,t)−µ
D
i,t/(µ
D
i,t−1)
is the interest rate dispersion term, while the aggregate deposit rate index evolves ac-
cording to:
(
RDi,t
) 1
1−µDi,t = θDi
(
RDi,t−1
) 1
1−µDi,t +
(
1− θDi
) (
RDi,t
) 1
1−µDi,t . (17)
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4 Estimation
4.1 Data
We split the Eurozone in two groups: core and periphery. Since EMU creation, coun-
tries with current account surpluses belong to the core country group, other coun-
tries belong to the peripheral group. In our sample, the core country group is made
of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,
while the peripheral group comprises Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal.
France is halfway since its current account had been positive from 1999 to 2003 and
we make the hypothesis that France is still a core country despite its recent current
account deficits.10
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods on Eurozone quarterly data over
the sample period 1999Q1 to 2013Q3, which makes 59 quarterly observations for each
variable (except for financial variables). The dataset includes 15 times series: real
GDP (Eurostat), real consumption (Eurostat), real investment (Eurostat), the ECB re-
financing operation rate (Eurostat, one year maturity), the HICP (ECB, overall index,
deseasonalized using a multiplicative decomposition), the overnight deposit rate of
households and firms (ECB), the outstanding amount of loan and lending rate to
non-financial corporations (ECB, 2003-2013, deseasonalized using a multiplicative
decomposition). Data with a trend are made stationary using a linear trend and are
divided by the population. We also demean the data because we do not use the in-
formation contained in the observable mean. Figure 3 plots the transformed data.11
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Figure 3: Observable variables
The methodology is standard to the Bayesian estimations of DSGE models. In-
terest rates data are annualized, we take into account this maturity by multiplying
10Quint and Rabanal (2014) use the same assumption, there are reasons that justify this choice.
The French government bond yield remains at very low levels, house prices and the credit-minus-
refinancing spread for firms remained quite stable during the financial crisis episode.
11Data related to loan supply and credit rates are missing between 1999 and 2003 as the ECB does
not provide backdated series before 2003 for these series.
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by 4 the rates in the measurement equation. The number of shocks and observable
variables are the same to avoid stochastic singularity issue. Recalling that i ∈ {c, p},
the vectors of observables:
Y obst = [∆ log Yˆi,t,∆ log Cˆi,t,∆ log Iˆi,t, rt,pici,t,∆ log Lˆsi,t, rLi,t, rDi,t]′,
and measurement equations:
Yt = [yˆi,t − yˆi,t−1, cˆi,t − cˆi,t−1, ıˆi,t − ıˆi,t−1, 4rˆt, pˆici,t, lˆsi,t − lˆsi,t−1, 4rˆLi,t, 4rˆDi,t]′,
where ∆ denotes the temporal difference operator, Xˆt is per capita variable of Xt and
xˆt is the loglinearized version of Xt. The model matches the data setting:
Y obst = Y + Yt,
where Y is the vector of the mean parameters, we suppose this is a vector of all
0. The posterior distribution combines the likelihood function with prior informa-
tion. To calculate the posterior distribution to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the
model, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is employed. We compute the posterior
moments of the parameters using a sufficiently large number of draws, having made
sure that the MCMC algorithm converged. To do this, a sample of 250, 000 draws was
generated, neglecting the first 50, 000. The scale factor was set in order to deliver ac-
ceptance rates of between 20 and 30 percent (The acceptance ratio per chains: 26.22%
and 26.28%). Convergence was assessed by means of the multivariate convergence
statistics taken from Brooks and Gelman (1998). We estimate the model using the
Dynare package of Adjemian et al. (2011).
4.2 Posteriors and Fit of the model
We fix a small number of parameters commonly used in the literature of real business
cycles models: these include β = 0.99 the discount factor, δ = 0.025 the quarterly
depreciation rate, α = 0.36 the capital share in the production and the share of steady
state hours worked H¯ = 1/3. The government expenditures to GDP ratio is set
at 24%.12 The substitutability between final good varieties εP =10 is calibrated as
in Smets and Wouters (2007), which roughly implies a markup of 11%. Regarding
financial parameters, we fix the net worth-to-capital ratio of entrepreneurs at N¯/K¯ =
0.3 as in Gerali et al. (2010). The steady state value of spreads (R¯− R¯D = 1.5/400 and
R¯L− R¯D = 4.3/400)13 and the bank balance sheet (D¯/L¯ = 0.46 and BK/L¯ = 0.11) are
calibrated at their respective average values observed in the data. The annual share
of insolvent entrepreneurs’ projects 1− η¯E is fixed at 2.5% and the quarterly cost of
monitoring µB is 0.12, in line with Bernanke et al. (1999). Following Kolasa (2009),
we set the parameter governing the relative size of the core area n at 65%, which is
the share implied by nominal GDP levels averaged over the period 1999-2013. The
rest of the model is estimated using Bayesian econometrics.
12On average, Euro Area households consumption represents 56% of the GDP and investment 20%,
then the exogenous spending-GDP ratio is straightforward to derive.
13Spreads are set on quarterly basis dividing them by 4. The steady state interest rates are R¯ =
0.01375, R¯D = 0.01, R¯K = 0.01881 and R¯L = 0.02075.
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Prior distributions Posterior distribution [5%:95%]
Shape Mean Std. CORE PERIPHERY
SHOCK PROCESS AR(1)
Productivity σAi IG 0.1 2 0.91 [0.74:1.07] 1.25 [0.99:1.49]
Gov. Spending σGi IG 0.1 2 1.34 [1.13:1.55] 2.12 [1.75:2.47]
Preferences σUi IG 0.1 2 0.67 [0.50:0.85] 0.81 [0.56:1.03]
Investment Adj. costs σIi IG 0.1 2 2.12 [1.61:2.58] 2.05 [1.55:2.55]
Net Wealth σNi IG 0.1 2 0.20 [0.11:0.30] 1.01 [0.61:1.32]
External Finance σQi IG 0.1 2 0.41 [0.28:0.55] 0.47 [0.29:0.64]
Bank Deposit σDi IG 0.1 2 0.04 [0.04:0.05] 0.05 [0.04:0.06]
Monetary Policy σR IG 0.1 2 0.09 [0.08:0.11]
Productivity root ρAi B 0.7 0.10 0.95 [0.92:0.98] 0.99 [0.99:0.99]
Gov. Spending root ρGi B 0.7 0.10 0.81 [0.73:0.90] 0.91 [0.86:0.96]
Preferences root ρUi B 0.7 0.10 0.71 [0.59:0.83] 0.64 [0.48:0.80]
Investment A.C. root ρIi B 0.7 0.10 0.59 [0.47:0.71] 0.59 [0.44:0.72]
Net Wealth root ρNi B 0.7 0.10 0.61 [0.40:0.81] 0.34 [0.22:0.46]
External Fin. Prem. root ρQi B 0.7 0.10 0.79 [0.69:0.88] 0.78 [0.69:0.87]
Bank Deposit root ρDi B 0.7 0.10 0.70 [0.62:0.78] 0.70 [0.60:0.80]
Monetary Policy root ρR B 0.7 0.10 0.40 [0.30:0.50]
Spending-Productivity ρagi B 0.8 0.05 0.82 [0.74:0.90] 0.81 [0.73:0.89]
Correlation Productivity corrAt N 0 0.40 0.39 [0.22:0.57]
Correlation Spending corrGt N 0 0.40 0.05 [-0.17:0.25]
Correlation Preferences corrUt N 0 0.40 -0.17 [-0.40:0.06]
Correlation Investment corrIt N 0 0.40 0.28 [0.08:0.48]
Correlation Net Wealth corrNt N 0 0.40 0.17 [-0.36:0.85]
Correlation EFP corrQt N 0 0.40 0.02 [-0.27:0.31]
Correlation Deposits corrDt N 0 0.40 0.95 [0.92:0.98]
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Consumption aversion σCi G 1.5 0.20 1.21 [0.95:1.48] 1.40 [1.11:1.68]
Labour Disutility σLi G 2 0.75 1.70 [0.73:2.64] 1.25 [0.52:2.00]
Consumption Inertia hCi B 0.7 0.10 0.17 [0.07:0.27] 0.38 [0.27:0.49]
Calvo Prices θPi B 0.5 0.10 0.71 [0.64:0.78] 0.62 [0.52:0.72]
Indexation Prices ξPi B 0.5 0.15 0.17 [0.05:0.29] 0.34 [0.13:0.54]
Calvo Loan Rates θLi B 0.5 0.10 0.49 [0.41:0.56] 0.59 [0.52:0.66]
Calvo Deposit Rates θDi B 0.5 0.10 0.73 [0.69:0.78] 0.70 [0.63:0.76]
Investment A.C. Cost χIi N 4 1.5 4.27 [2.61:5.99] 5.52 [3.78:7.18]
E.F.P. Elasticity κi N 0.05 0.02 0.05 [0.02:0.09] 0.07 [0.03:0.11]
Loan Demand hLi B 0.7 0.10 0.76 [0.64:0.88] 0.82 [0.75:0.89]
Deposit A.C. cost 100× χDi N 0.07 0.04 0.09 [0.03:0.15] 0.11 [0.05:0.16]
Final Market Openness αCi B 0.12 0.05 0.17 [0.12:0.22] 0.15 [0.07:0.22]
Inv. Market Openness αIi B 0.12 0.05 0.11 [0.05:0.17] 0.13 [0.06:0.21]
Substitutability Goods µ G 1.5 0.5 2.44 [2.01:2.85]
MPR Smoothing ρ B 0.7 0.10 0.16 [0.08:0.23]
MPR Inflation φpi N 1.5 0.50 2.37 [1.94:2.81]
MPR GDP φ∆y N 0.125 0.05 0.85 [0.83:0.89]
Marginal log-likelihood -574.36
Table 2: Prior and Posterior distributions of structural parameters and shock pro-
cesses. Note: IG denotes the Inverse Gamma distribution, B the Beta,N the Normal,
G the Gamma.
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Figure 4 reports the prior and posterior distributions of the parameters.14 For a
majority of new Keynesian parameters, i.e. σCi , σ
L
i , h
C
i , θ
P
i , ξ
P
i , χ
I
i , φ
pi, φ∆y and shock
process parameters, we use prior distributions close to Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007) and Kolasa (2009). Calvo probabilities are assumed to be around 0.5 for prices,
credit rates and deposit rates, which is quite uninformative and rely largely on Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) and Darracq-Pariès et al. (2011). Concerning international
macroeconomic parameters, our priors follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2006): for fi-
nal goods market openness αCi and α
I
i , we choose a beta distribution with prior mean
0, 12 and standard deviation 0.05,15 at last substitutabilities between home/foreign
final goods are set to 1.5 with standard deviations of 0.5. We set the prior for the elas-
ticity of the external finance premium κi to a beta distribution with prior mean equal
to 0.05 and standard deviation 0.02 consistent with previous financial accelerator es-
timates (Gilchrist et al., 2009a; Bailliu et al., 2015). Adjustment cost on deposits χDi is
supposed to fluctuate around 0.0007 with a standard deviation of 0.0004, this prior is
in line with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Finally, we estimate the cross-country
correlation between structural shocks to capture the correlation and co-movements
between countries’ aggregates. In line with Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) and Kolasa
(2009), we set the mean of the prior distribution for the shock correlations between
core countries and peripheral countries equal to 0 with a large standard deviation of
0.4.
All estimated structural parameters are significantly different from zero. Main ob-
served differences between core and peripheral countries originate from both shocks
and structural parameters. The estimated standard deviation of shocks is larger in
peripheral countries. The persistence of shocks is similar between countries except
for the net wealth shock: entrepreneurs’ net wealth in peripheral countries experi-
ences larger and more volatile innovations. The desynchronization of business cy-
cles is also driven by price and interest rate stickiness, capital demand habits and
investment adjustment costs. The transmission of monetary policy is not symmetric,
particularly on the credit market, as interest rate stickiness is higher in the periphery.
To assess how well the model fits the data, we present in Table 3 the second mo-
ments of the observable variables and their counterpart in the model. The model
does reasonably well in explaining the standard deviation of all variables except for
deposit rates, despite allowing for different degrees of nominal rigidities via the in-
troduction of Calvo contracts. Our model incorporates an imperfect credit market
with real rigidities, in this way the model does a good job in predicting the standard
deviation and persistence of investment and credit in both area.
14The posterior distribution combines the likelihood function with prior information. To calculate
the posterior distribution to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the model, the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm is employed. We compute the posterior moments of the parameters using a sample of gener-
ated 250, 000 while, neglecting the first 50, 000. The scale factor was set in order to deliver acceptance
rates of between 20 and 30 percent (The acceptance ratio per chains: 26.22% and 26.28%). Conver-
gence was assessed by means of the multivariate convergence statistics taken from Brooks and Gel-
man (1998). We estimate the model using the dynare package Adjemian et al. (2011).
15The intra-zone openness is calculated by Eyquem and Poutineau (2010) at αIc = αIp = 0.04 and
αCc = α
C
p = 0.09. Ours priors are chosen to be near these values.
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Figure 4: Prior and posterior distributions of parameters.
2nd Moments - Standard Deviation
∆Yi,t ∆Ci,t ∆Ii,t ∆Lsi,t pi
C
i,t R
L
i,t R
D
i,t
Empirical - core 0.78 0.60 1.66 1.25 0.30 1.00 0.36
Theoretical - core 0.72 0.68 1.68 1.50 0.42 1.28 0.78
Empirical - periphery 0.94 0.91 2.08 2.25 0.36 0.76 0.34
Theoretical - periphery 0.86 0.91 1.92 2.31 0.45 1.57 0.82
Table 3: Empirical and Theoretical Standard deviations
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5 An assessment of Macroprudential Policy
5.1 Benchmark results
Policy evaluation is based on a second order approximation of equilibrium condi-
tions of the model using estimated parameters of Figure 4 at their posterior mean.16
Table 4 provides a ranking of implementation schemes based on the per capita union-
wide level welfare increase expressed in permanent consumption equivalent with
respect to the benchmark of the estimated Taylor rule. Figures in brackets report in-
creases in permanent consumption equivalent with respect to the benchmark of an
optimal interest rate rule.
As a first result, the optimized coefficients of the Taylor rule suggest stronger re-
sponses to Eurozone inflation than the estimated coefficients. This result is in line
with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Quint and Rabanal (2014). Turning to op-
timized macroprudential parameters, we find that the two regions of the monetary
union should be contrasted. Namely, estimated parameters are much higher for pe-
ripheral countries (either φp = 0.13 when applied to the global evolution of loans in
the Eurozone, or φp = 0.15 when applied to regional loan developments). In con-
trast, core countries do not require any such macroprudential measures based on
credit developments (as φc = 0 when applied to regional loan developments). A
uniform setting of the macroprudential parameter leads to a parameter value biased
towards peripheral countries, imposing a high and inefficient countercyclical policy
reaction to core countries loan developments.
Unsurprisingly, macroprudential measures increase welfare at the Eurozone level.
Depending on the implementation scheme, welfare gains may represent between
0.0235% and 0.0372% of permanent consumption increase with respect to the esti-
mated Taylor rule (welfare gains are more limited when assessed with regards to the
benchmark of an optimal monetary policy). Our simulations suggest that conducting
macroprudential actions in core countries does not improve welfare, the main driver
of this finding lies in the low variance of the net wealth shock for core entrepreneurs.
The drivers of welfare improving macroprudential measures are further discussed in
the robustness check section.
As reported, solutions based on a heterogeneous reaction of macroprudential in-
struments always dominate an uniform setting of the macroprudential parameter.
This result makes sense as increasing the number of optimized policy parameters
necessarily improves Eurozone welfare. Noticeably, the gap between the two op-
posite situations (1) and (4) is relatively high, as the granular solution increases the
per capita permanent consumption of the representative Eurozone agent by 58.29 %
with respect to the uniform implementation of macroprudential policy on European
average loan developments. In most of the situations, peripheral countries are the
main winners following the conduct of macroprudential policy. As an exception,
16In the quantitative simulation, we first search for weights attached to inflation φpi and GDP
growth φ∆y in the Taylor rule that gives the highest unconditional welfare of households. Here, we
maintain the autoregressive parameter of the policy rule ρ at its estimated value since it has low ef-
fects on welfare. Based on the grid search by 0.01 unit, we limit our attention to policy coefficients in
the interval (1, 3] for φpi , [0, 3] for φ∆y as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), and in the interval [0, 1] for
macroprudential instruments φc and φp.
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Taylor Macro Unconditional
Rule Prud Consumption Gains (%)
φpi φ∆y φc φp Union Core Periph.
Empirical Monetary Rule 2.37 0.16 - - -0.0196 -0.0280 -0.0092
Optimal Monetary Rule 3 0 - - - - -
(1) MP t & φc = φp 3 0 0.07 0.0235[0.0040]
0.0274
[-0.0010]
0.0188
[0.0100]
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 0.13 0.0302[0.0110]
0.0216
[-0.0060]
0.0407
[0.0320]
(3) MP i,t & φc = φp 3 0 0.09 0.0296[0.0100]
0.0197
[-0.0083]
0.0418
[0.0325]
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 0.15 0.0372[0.0180]
0.0212
[-0.0070]
0.0570
[0.0480]
Note: Wefare gains are expressed in permanent consumption equivalent with respect to the benchmark of the estimated Taylor
rule, figures in brackets report increases in permanent consumption equivalent with respect to the benchmark of an optimal
interest rate rule.
Table 4: Welfare-based performances of optimal simple macroprudential rules
the implementation of macroprudential measures set uniformly on global loan de-
velopments leads to the worst situation, as union-wide averages dampen the level
of financial imbalances with respect to the actual situation of this group of coun-
tries. The welfare gap between the two extreme situations (1) and (4) is much higher
for peripheral countries than the one encountered for Eurozone averages. In con-
trast, core countries only marginally gain from the implementation of macropruden-
tial measures. The best increase in permanent consumption observed in the granu-
lar situation (4), only represents 37% of the value reached by peripheral countries.
More critically, contrasting the welfare consequences of the granular situation (4)
with the equilibrium reached if the central bank implements an optimal interest rate
rule, clearly shows that core countries are worse-off in this situation, as welfare may
decrease by 0.007%, thus creating a caveat questioning the interest of adopting coor-
dinated macroprudential measures with peripheral countries.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In the rest of the paper, we assess the stability of the two optimal policy outcomes
(2) and (4) displayed in Table 4 with respect to parameters related to the financial
component of the model (optimism of entrepreneurs and rigidity in interest rates),
with respect to policy considerations (value of parameters in the Taylor Rule, Pecking
order in the choice of macroprudential measures) and with respect to the period of
estimation of the model. For all experiments reported in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7,
we find that the ranking between the two types of policies is kept unchanged.
As reported, for all cases, the reaction of macroprudential instruments to regional
developments leads to higher welfare improvements. Nevertheless, the aggregate
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Taylor Macro Unconditional
Rule Pru Consumption Gains (%)
φpi φ∆y φc φp Union Core Periph.
No expectation bias (κi = 0)
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 1 0.3908 -0.0872 0.9766
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 3 0 1 1 1.1667 -0.1259 2.7365
Flexible credit rates (θLi = 0)
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 2.66 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 2.66 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flexible deposit rates (θDi = 0)
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 2.51 0 0 0.11 0.0074 -0.0034 0.0208
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 2.51 0 0 0.12 0.0144 -0.0033 0.0363
Near-flexible prices (θPi = 0.01)
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 1.57 1 0 0.16 0.0264 -0.0049 0.0648
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 1.57 1 0 0.13 0.0256 0.0009 0.0560
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis of macroprudential stances to financial frictions
welfare increase reached at the union-wide level fluctuates quite much, as it ranks
from -0.0047 (in the case of a pecking order policy where periphery moves first) to
0.3908 (in the case of no expectation bias) for policy (2) and from 0 (in the case of es-
timation limited to the pre-crisis period) to 1.167 (in the case of no expectation bias)
for policy (2). Furthermore, regional outcomes are also affected by the sensitivity ex-
periment, and in some situations, we may observe regional welfare reversals leading
to welfare transfers between the two regions of the monetary union.
The role of financial and nominal frictions
The first series of results reported in Table 5 focuses on the parameters related to
the financial component of the model. In the first part of the table, the absence of
bias in the expectations of entrepreneurs (namely, imposing κi = 0) requires tighter
macroprudential policy actions. At a first sight, this result may be rather surprising
as one could expect that an over-expectation of entrepreneur’s outcomes may lead to
over-borrowing. This, in turn would create greater damages to the economy and, by
so, would imply more pronounced macroprudential policy measures. Instead, the
absence of optimism has opposite effects according to the type of shock: it damp-
ens standard demand and supply shocks but exacerbates financial shocks. In this
later situation, the transmission channel of the financial shock through the external
finance premium disappears, leading to a larger adjustment of the economy though
the quantities of loans and output, rather than in the rate of return on capital. The
larger effects coming from a financial shock require a stronger reaction from macro-
prudential authorities.17
17In further sensitivity experiments, removing both firms’ optimism and financial shocks, our
model reveals that macroprudential policy is passive, as the equilibrium of the model is character-
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Another series of results reported in Table 5 focuses on the consequences of in-
terest rate stickiness. As observed, the sensitivity analysis devoted to the staggered
setting of lending interest rates clearly underlines the role of macroprudential pol-
icy in overcoming inefficiencies arising from their stickiness: when lending interest
rates are fully flexible (namely, θLi = 0), macroprudential policy does no longer im-
prove welfare with respect to the benchmark of an optimal monetary policy. This
result makes sense, as sticky interest rates are not able to transmit the business cycles
developments to borrowers and may thus lead to either under or over borrowing de-
cisions incurring welfare losses. In this situation, macroprudential measures are able
to foster interest rate adjustments that affect lending decisions and lead to welfare
gains. Put differently, our model reveals that in this case macroprudential policy is
passive, as the equilibrium of the model is characterized by an optimal macropru-
dential stance equal to zero. Flexible rates on deposits (namely θDi = 0) decrease
welfare gains with respect to the benchmark situation. However, there are still wel-
fare gains, as the major friction regarding the staggered interest rate on loans is not
corrected.
Finally, the last situation reported in Table 5 focuses on near flexible prices (θPi =
0.01). This sensitivity exercise has two main consequences on the model: it sup-
presses a nominal friction (thus reducing the effect of macroeconomic policies on
the general equilibrium of the model) and it imposes a symmetric price adjustment
mechanism between the two regions of the Eurozone. The first effect clearly explains
the decrease in welfare gains. The second effect has another interesting property: by
imposing an homogenous speed of price adjustment in all the regions of the Euro-
zone, we find that a macroprudential policy reacting to union-wide financial devel-
opments leads to almost the same welfare gains in the monetary union than instru-
ments tailored to regional financial developments (respectively 0.0264 and 0.0256).
Thus, asymmetries in the adjustment of prices seem to be an important factor that
shapes the transmission of macroprudential measures and makes the choice of a re-
action to regional financial developments worthwhile.
The role of the policy environment
The second series of sensitivity experiments conducted in Table 6 reports robustness
checks related to the policy environment. We more particularly evaluate how restric-
tions set on the design of the optimal policy drive our results and may lead to wel-
fare reversals. We successively consider the sensitivity of our results to assumptions
related to the objective function, the benchmark situation of an optimal monetary
policy, the homogeneity of the Taylor rule over the whole monetary union and the
pecking order in the optimization of regional macroprudential policy parameters.
In the first item of Table 6, we evaluate how the zero lower bound parameter
λR affects welfare outcomes. Even if in the benchmark calibration our model does
not hit the zero lower bound, accounting for this possibility affects welfare, as the
authorities take into account the variability of the interest rate as a determinant of
welfare. Ignoring the zero lower bound mechanically leads to more welfare gains
reached by the optimal monetary policy, thus leaving less role for macroprudential
ized by an optimal macroprudential stance equal to zero.
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Taylor Macro Unconditional
Rule Pru Consumption Gains (%)
φpi φ∆y φc φp Union Core Periph.
No zero lower bound (λR = 0)
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 0.13 0.0106 -0.0064 0.0315
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 0.15 0.0177 -0.0069 0.0477
Estimated taylor rule
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 2.37 0.16 0 0.12 0.0088 -0.004 0.0245
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 2.37 0.16 0 0.12 0.0149 -0.0034 0.0373
Country-specific taylor rules
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp (3,1) (0,0) 0 0.06 0.0019 -0.0001 0.0044
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp (3,1) (0,0) 0.01 0.07 0.0065 0.0023 0.0117
Pecking order - periphery first
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0.08 0.14 -0.0047 0.004 -0.0155
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0.03 0.14 0.0162 -0.0056 0.0429
Pecking order - core first
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0.08 0.15 0.0055 -0.0032 0.0163
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0.03 0.14 0.0162 -0.0056 0.0429
Table 6: Robustness checks to policy rule assumptions
policy to affect welfare gains. Thus as clearly reported, we find that in this case the
union-wide welfare increase is much lower, and that it creates welfare transfers from
the core to the periphery for both policies (2) and (4).
In the second item of Table 6, we evaluate the sensitivity of welfare gains to the
choice of the benchmark monetary policy. In this experiment, we replace the optimal
monetary policy benchmark used in the analysis conveyed in Table 4 by an estimated
Taylor rule giving less weight to price stability (the Taylor parameter is 2.32 instead of
3) and accounting for output growth concerns. As reported the choice of the bench-
mark has only scale effects on the results without affecting the relative ranking of the
two macroprudential policy schemes. However, conducting a non-optimal monetary
policy creates international welfare transfers between the two regions of the mone-
tary union so that the core situation clearly deteriorates with respect to the bench-
mark results reported in Table 4, thus questioning the implementation of macropru-
dential measures in this part of the monetary union.
In the third item of Table 6, we evaluate the consequences of setting country-
specific Taylor rules to investigate whether macroprudential policy rules are just a
substitute to country-adjusted Taylor rules. Even when Taylor rules are set on a na-
tional basis, macroprudential policy still plays a role in improving the welfare of the
Eurozone with respect to the benchmark situation.
In the fourth item of Table 6 we evaluate the consequences of letting either re-
gions of the monetary union becoming a leader in the choice of the macroprudential
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Taylor Macro Unconditional
Rule Pru Consumption Gains (%)
φpi φ∆y φc φp Union Core Periph.
Pre-crisis subsample 1999-2008
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 0.21 0.0015 -0.0034 0.0108
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Post-crisis subsample 2008-2013
(2) MP t & φc 6= φp 1.62 0 0 1 0.0227 0.0027 0.0588
(4) MP i,t & φc 6= φp 1.62 0 0.03 1 0.0712 0.0546 0.0928
Table 7: Robustness checks to the sample before and after the crisis
policy, leaving the other region to adjust its policy choices. Two situations are succes-
sively analyzed depending on the leading region. Unsurprisingly, the welfare gains
are clearly lower than the ones obtained in the original policy experiment, as a Stack-
elberg situation replaces a cooperative setting of macroprudential parameters. Two
main results emerge from this outcome: first, if macroprudential policy is conducted
with instruments reacting to union-wide developments, the region that moves first
incurs welfare losses, creating a welfare transfer towards the rest of the monetary
union. In this case, the follower is able to adjust its policy stance in a better way and
records welfare gains. Second, when each region adopts a macroprudential instru-
ment that reacts to regional developments, the results are unaffected by the nature of
the pecking order, since in all cases, we observe a welfare transfer from the core to
the periphery.
The role of structural shifts
Finally as a last robustness exercise, we analyze whether our results are altered by
any structural shift caused by the financial crisis episode. As reported in Table 7,
we split the data sample, using 2008Q1 as the cut-off quarter. To avoid any prob-
lem related to the weak identification of estimated parameters coming from the very
small number of observations in subsamples, we run our welfare simulations using
the model estimated at the mode. Results displayed in Table 7 still assume the Stack-
elberg assumption for monetary-macroprudential policy interactions, as these mea-
sures are chosen after monetary policy decisions based on the simple optimal Taylor
rule. As observed, splitting the sample slightly affects our results: peripheral coun-
tries are always net gainers, while core countries experience welfare losses before the
crisis and gains after the crisis. Furthermore, monetary policy appears to be strongly
affected by the financial turmoil since the Taylor parameter shrinks to 1.62. This drop
may probably come from the zero lower bound faced by the central bank after the
crisis. The low interest rates environment since 2008 seems to have exacerbated the
effectiveness of macroprudential policy through an increase in the prudential policy
stance in periphery and a global welfare improvement for the Eurosystem.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has reported significant welfare increases coming from a granular imple-
mentation of macroprudential policy tailored to regional developments. However,
welfare gains are unequally shared between peripheral and core countries. In the
best situation, core countries only gain 37% of the peripheral welfare increase using
the benchmark of an estimated Taylor rule. More critically, they may even be worse-
off, with respect to the conduct of an optimal monetary policy conducted at the union
level. In terms of policy implications, our experiments reveal that macroprudential
policy should be adjusted to the regional level, thus confirming the current insti-
tutional framework adopted in the Euro Area based on national macroprudential
measures.
Overall, results presented in this paper are a preliminary study of the design
of macroprudential policy in an heterogeneous monetary union. Future research
should encompass the use of alternative macroprudential instruments more directly
adapted to the problem observed by each group of countries to get comparable re-
gional and global welfare gains in a monetary union. In addition, the microfounda-
tion of macroprudential policy is still a missing ingredient in most of macro-models
that should deserve further refinement in the next generation of DSGE models.
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A Appendix: The Non-Linear Model
Our model describes a monetary union made of two asymmetric regions i ∈ {c, p}
(where c is for core and p for periphery). Each area i of the monetary union is of
a relative size ni normalized to 1 with respective size n and 1− n for the core and
peripheral area. Each country is populated by consumers, intermediate and final
producers, entrepreneurs, capital suppliers and a banking system. Regarding the
conduct of macroeconomic policy, we assume national fiscal authorities and a com-
mon central bank. The implementation of the macroprudential policy is left open,
and discussed below. We account for several sources of rigidities to enhance the em-
pirical relevance of the model. The set of real rigidities encompasses consumption
habits, investment adjustment costs, loan demand habits. Regarding nominal rigidi-
ties, we account for stickiness in final goods prices and loan/deposit interest rates.
Due to the asymmetry between countries, for each variable denoted Xi,t (x), we
aggregate households, firms, entrepreneurs and banks using the following aggrega-
tor for agent x ∈ [0, 1] living in the monetary union:
G (Xi,t (x)) =
{ ∫ n
0 Xc,t (x)dx for i = c∫ 1
n Xp,t (x)dx for i = p
. (18)
A.1 Households
In each economy there is a continuum of identical households who consume, save
and work in intermediate firms. The total number of households is normalized to 1.
The representative household j maximizes the welfare index:
max
{Ci,t(j),Hi,t(j),Ddi,t+1(j)}
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
βτeε
U
i,t+τ
(Ci,t+τ(j)− hCi Ci,t−1+τ)1−σCi
1− σci
− χi
H
1+σHi
i,t+τ(j)
1+ σLi
 ,
(19)
subject to:
Wi,t
PCi,t
Hi,t(j) + (1+ RDi,t−1)
Ddi,t (j)
PCi,t
+
Πi,t(j)
PCi,t
+
M¯i(j)
PCi,t
= Ci,t(j) +
Ddi,t+1(j)
PCi,t
+
Ti,t(j)
PCi,t
+
Pi,t
PCi,t
ACDi,t(j) (20)
Here, Ci,t (j) is the consumption index, hCi ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that accounts for
external consumption habits, Hi,t (j) is labor effort, εUi,t is an exogenous AR(1) shock
to household preferences. The income of the representative household is made of la-
bor income (with nominal wage, Wi,t), interest payments for deposits, (where Ddi,t (j)
stands for the deposit subscribed in period t− 1 and 1 + RDi,t−1 is the gross nominal
rate of interest between period t − 1 an period t), and earnings Πi,t (j) from share-
holdings.18 The representative household spends this income on consumption, de-
posits and tax payments (for a nominal amount of Ti,t (j)). Finally, he has to pay
18Positive profits are generated from monopolistic competition on intermediate good market.
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quadratic adjustment costs to buy new deposit services (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2003), according to the function, ACDi,t (j) = 0.5χ
D
i (D
d
i,t+1 (j)− D¯di (j))2/D¯di (j), where
D¯di (j) is the steady state level of deposits. In order to make the households/banks
deposit problem tractable in the steady state, we assume that households hold a con-
stant quantity of real money balances M¯i (j).
The first order conditions that solve this problem can be summarized with an
Euler condition:
β
(
1+ RDi,t
)
1+ Pi,t ACD′i,t (j)
= Et
 eε
U
i,t
eε
U
i,t+1
Pci,t+1
Pci,t
(
Ci,t+1 (j)− hCi Ci,t
Ci,t (j)− hCi Ci,t−1
)σCi  , (21)
and a labor supply function:
Wi,t
PCi,t
= χiHi,t (j)
σLi
(
Ci,t (j)− hCi Ci,t−1
)σCi . (22)
The consumption basket of the representative household and the consumption price
index of country i are:
Ci,t(j) = ((1− αCi )1/µChi,t(j)(µ−1)/µ + (αCi )1/µC f i,t (j)
(µ−1)/µ
)µ/(µ−1), (23)
and PCi,t = ((1− αCi )P1−µh,t + αCi P
1−µ
f ,t )
1/(1−µ) where µ is the elasticity of substitution
between the consumption of home (Ch,i,t(j)) and foreign (C f ,i,t (j)) goods and αCi is
the degree of openness of the economy i. In this model, we assume home bias in
consumption, so that αCi <
1
2 .
A.2 Firms
This sector is populated by two groups of agents: intermediate firms and final firms.
Intermediate firms produce differentiated goods i, choose labor and capital inputs,
and set prices according to the Calvo model. Final goods producers act as a consump-
tion bundler by combining national intermediate goods to produce the homogenous
final good.19
Concerning the representative intermediate firm i, it has the following technol-
ogy:
Yi,t (i) = e
εAi,t Ki,t (i)
α Hdi,t (i)
1−α , (24)
where Yi,t (i) is the production function of the intermediate good that combines capi-
tal Ki,t (i), labor Hdi,t (i) and technology ε
A
i,t (an AR(1) productivity shock). Intermedi-
ate goods producers solve a two-stages problem. In the first stage, taking input prices
Wi,t and Zi,t as given, firms rent inputs Hdi,t (i) and Ki,t (i) in a perfectly competitive
19Final good producers are perfectly competitive and maximize profits, Pi,tYdi,t− G (Pi,t (i)Yi,t (i)),
subject to the production function Ydi,t = ((1/ni)
1/epG(Yi,t (i)(ep−1)/ep))ep/(ep−1). We find the inter-
mediate demand functions associated with this problem are, Yi,t (i) = (1/ni) (Pi,t(i)/Pi,t)
−ep Ydi,t, ∀i.
where Ydi,t is the aggregate demand.
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factor markets in order to minimize costs subject to the production constraint. The
first order condition leads to the marginal cost expression:
MCi,t(i) = MCi,t =
1
eε
A
i,t
(
Zi,t
α
)α ( Wi,t
(1− α)
)(1−α)
. (25)
From the cost minimization problem, inputs also satisfy:
αHdi,t (i)Wi,t = Zi,tKi,t (i) (1− α) . (26)
In the second-stage, firm i sets the price according to a Calvo mechanism. Each pe-
riod, firms are allowed to re-optimize its price with probability θPi but price increases
of ξPi ∈ [0, 1] at last period’s rate of price inflation, while for the other remaining frac-
tion 1− θPi , these firms are able to reset their selling price optimally. The dynamic of
prices given these two possible states reads as follows:
Pi,t (i) =
{
pi
ξPi
i,t−1Pi,t−1 (i) with probability θ
P
i ,
P∗i,t (i) with probability 1− θPi .
The firm allowed to modify its selling price with a probability 1 − θPi chooses
P∗i,t(i) to maximize its expected sum of profits:
max
{P∗i,t(i)}
Et
{
∑∞τ=0
(
θPi β
)τ λci,t+τ
λci,t
[
P∗i,t (i)
PCi,t+τ
τ
∏
k=1
pi
ξPi
i,t+k−1 −
MCi,t+τ
PCi,t+τ
]
Yi,t+τ (i)
}
,
under the demand constraint:
Yi,t+τ (i) =
1
ni
(
∏τk=1pi
ξPi
i,t+k−1
P∗i,t (i)
Pi,t+τ
)−eP
Ydi,t+τ, ∀ τ > 0,
where Ydi,t represents the quantity of the goods produced in country i and λ
c
i,t the
household marginal utility of consumption.
A.3 The Banking Sector and the Imperfect Pass-Through of Policy
Rate
The representative bank b in country i collects deposits from households and lends
to firms. The balance sheet of the bank reads as follows:
Lsi,t+1 (b) = Di,t+1 (b) + L
RF
i,t+1 (b) + BKi,t+1 (b) . (27)
In this expression, Lsi,t is the total level of loans supplied by bank b, Di,t (b) is the total
level of deposit services offered by bank b of country i to households, LRFi,t+1 (b) is the
one-period refinancing loans to banks by the ECB and BKi,t+1 (b) is the bank capital.
The representative bank sets the rate of interest RLi,t (b) and R
D
i,t (b).
Banks finance heterogeneous investment projects conducted by entrepreneurs,
some of these projects are gainful with a probability ηEi,t+1. Following Bernanke et al.
28
(1999), if the borrower’s project is gainful, the representative bank obtains ηEi,t+1(1+
RLi,t (b))L
s
i,t+1 (b), whereas if the entrepreneur’s project is insolvent, the bank must
pay auditing costs µB to obtain its loan,20 thereby the expected value of next period
earnings is:
EtΠBi,t+1 (b) =
[
Etη
E
i,t+1 +
(
1− µB
) (
1− ηEi,t+1
)] (
1+ RLi,t (b)
)
Lsi,t+1 (b) (28)
− (1+ Rt) LRFi,t+1 (b)−
(
1+ RDi,t
)
Di,t+1 (b) .
In this setting, we assume that there is no discrimination between borrowers, so
that the representative and risk-neutral bank serves both domestic and foreign en-
trepreneur without taking into account specificities regarding the national viability
of projects. Concerning bank capital, we follow Hirakata et al. (2009) by assuming
the law of motion of the net wealth is made of the profits of the previous period:
BKi,t+1 (b) =
(
1− τBi
)
ΠBi,t (b) , (29)
where τBi denotes a proportional tax on the revenues of the bank by national govern-
ments.21
As in Darracq-Pariès et al. (2011), we take into account the imperfect pass-through
of policy rate on bank lending/deposit rates. We suppose that banks set their interest
rates on a staggered basis with some degree of nominal rigidity à la Calvo.
Loan supply decisions
The determination of interest rate on loans is as follows: the representative bank b
maximizes expected profit from Equation 28 with respect to Lsi,t+1 (b) to obtain the
expression of the marginal cost of producing new loans:
1+ MCLi,t (b) =
(1+ Rt)[
1− µB
(
1−EtηEi,t+1
)] . (30)
The representative retail bank b acts monopolistically to provide loans to entrepreneurs.
It determines the interest rate on loans contracted by entrepreneurs. Assuming that
it is able to modify its loan interest rate with a probability 1− θLi , it chooses RL∗i,t (b)
to maximize its expected sum of profits:
max
{RL∗i,t (b)}
Et
{
∞
∑
τ=0
(
θLi β
)τ λci,t+τ
λci,t
[
RL∗i,t (b)−MCLi,t+τ
]
Li,t+1+τ (b)
}
,
20i.e., banks recover (1− µB)(1− ηi,t+1)((1 + RLi,tb))Lsi,t+1 (b): we borrow this shortcut from Benes
et al. (2014), which is a tractable and easier way to introduce the loss-given-default µB than in the
initial framework of Bernanke et al. (1999) where investors have a technology to size the collateral in
case of default.
21This tax is necessary to solve the model in steady state. In the same vein, Bernanke et al. (1999)
and Hirakata et al. (2011) also add a cost/decay parameter in law of motion of the net wealth.
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subject to the demand constraint, Li,t+1+τ (b) = (1/ni)
(
RL∗i,t (b) /R
L
i,t+τ
)−eL
Li,t+1+τ,
τ > 0, where Li,t (b) denotes the quantity of differentiated banking loans b that is
used in loans packer production. Finally, the interest rate that solves the FOC for the
bank that is allowed to modify its interest rate, it is such that:
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(
θLi β
)τ λci,t+τ
λci,t
[
RL∗i,t (b)−
eL
(eL − 1)MC
L
i,t+τ
]
Li,t+1+τ (b) = 0. (31)
Deposit supply decisions
We proceed accordingly for the determination of deposit interest rate. The nominal
marginal cost of one unit of deposit denoted by MCDi,t is the same across banks and is
related to the ECB refinancing rate:
1+ MCDi,t (b) = 1+ MC
D
i,t = (1+ Rt) . (32)
Assuming sticky deposit rates, the expected sum of profits for the bank that is al-
lowed to modify its interest rate with a probability 1− θDi can be expressed as:
max
{RD∗i,t (b)}
Et
{
∑∞τ=0
(
θDi β
)τ λci,t+τ
λci,t
[
MCDi,t+τ − RD∗i,t (b)
]
Di,t+1+τ (b)
}
, (33)
under the constraint, Di,t+1+τ (b) = 1ni
(
RD∗i,t (b) /R
D
i,t+τ
)−µDi,t+τ/(µDi,t+τ−1) Ddi,t+1+τ, ∀τ >
0, where µDi,t = e
D/
(
eD − 1)+ εDi,t is the time-varying markup subject to the exoge-
nous deposit rate-push shock process εDi,t. In equilibrium, the following first order
condition emerges:
∑∞τ=0
(
θDi β
)τ λci,t+τ
λci,t
1
µDi,t+τ − 1
[
RD∗i,t (b)− µDi,t+τMCDi,t+τ
]
Di,t+1+τ (b) = 0. (34)
A.4 Capital Suppliers
Capital suppliers are homogeneous and distributed over a continuum normalized
to one. The representative capital supplier k ∈ [0; 1] acts competitively to supply a
quantity Ki,t+1 (k) of capital. Investment is costly, i.e. the capital supplier pays an ad-
justment cost ACIi,t (k) on investment, such that AC
I
i,t (k) = 0.5χ
I
i (e
εIi,t Ii,t (k) /Ii,t−1 (k)−
1)2 where εIi,t is an exogenous adjustment cost shock on investment. The capital stock
of the representative capital supplier thus evolves according to:
Ki,t+1 (k) =
(
1− ACIi,t (k)
)
Ii,t (k) + (1− δ)Ki,t (k) .
The capital supplier produces the new capital stock Qi,tKi,t+1 (k) by buying the de-
preciated capital Qi,t (1− δ)Ki,t (k) and investment goods PIi,t Ii,t (k) where:
Ii,t(k) = ((1− αIi )1/µ Ihi,t(k)(µ−1)/µ + (αIi )1/µ I f i,t(k)(µ−1)/µ)µ/(µ−1),
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and:
PIi,t = ((1− αIi )(Ph,t)1−µ + αIi (Pf ,t)1−µ)1/(1−µ).
In this expression, parameter µ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods in investment and αIi < 0.5 measures the degree of investment diver-
sification in the monetary union between home and foreign countries. The represen-
tative capital supplier chooses Ii,t (k) to maximize profits:
max
{Ii,t(k)}
Et
{
∑∞τ=0βτ
λci,t+τ
λci,t
[
Qi,t
(
1− ACIi,t (k)
)
− PIi,t
]
Ii,t (k)
}
,
where βτλci,t+τ/λ
c
i,t is the household stochastic discount factor. The price of capital
renting thus solves:
Qi,t = PIi,t + Qi,t
∂(Ii,t(k)ACIi,t(k))
∂Ii,t(k)
+ βEt
λci,t+1
λci,t
Qi,t+1
∂(Ii,t+1(k)ACIi,t+1(k))
∂Ii,t(k)
.
Thus, the real return from holding one unit of capital from t to t + 1 is determined
by:
Et
(1+ Rki,t+1)
pici,t+1
= Et
[
Zi,t+1/PCi,t+1 + (1− δ)Qi,t+1/PCi,t+1
Qi,t/PCi,t
]
. (35)
A.5 Governments
National governments finance public spending by charging proportional taxes on
the bank capital τBi , net wealth of entrepreneurs τ
E
i and by receiving a total value of
taxes G (Ti,t (j)) from households. The budget constraint of the national government
is determined by:
G (Ti,t (j)) + τEi G (Ni,t (e)) + τBi G (BKi,t (b)) = Pi,tGi,t = Pi,tG¯εGi,t,
where Gi,t is the total amount of public spending in the ith economy that follows
an AR(1) shock process. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we assume that ex-
ogenous spending is affected by the productivity shock at a degree ρagi such that
εGi,t = ρ
G
i ε
G
i,t−1 + η
G
i,t + ρ
ag
i η
A
i,t. The government demand for home goods is, Gi,t (i) =
(Pi,t (i) /Pi,t)
−eP Gi,t.
A.6 The welfare index
In each country, we compute the fraction of consumption stream from alternative
monetary policy regime to be added (or subtracted) to achieve the benchmark refer-
ence. The welfare of aggregate households in country i can be expressed as:
Wi,t =∑∞τ=0βτUi (Ci,t+τ, Hi,t+τ) , i = {c, p} (36)
where the utility function is defined by:
Ui (Ci,t, Hi,t) = eε
U
i,t
(Ci,t − hCi Ci,t−1)1−σCi
1− σCi
− χi
H
1+σHi
i,t
1+ σHi
− λR (Rt − R¯)2 (37)
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Following Woodford (2003) and Darracq-Pariès et al. (2011), we account for the zero
lower bound by adding to the utility function a term λR (Rt − R¯)2 that makes the
probability of hitting the zero lower bound shrink. Assuming that the Eurosystem
authorities are concerned by the mean welfare of the two countries, we defined the
welfare objectiveWt of the monetary union by the arithmetical average according to
the size of each area composing the union:
Wt = nWc,t + (1− n)Wp,t (38)
After solving the model under regime a and b using 10,000 draws generated by the
model for each regime, we obtain the asymptotic mean E [.] of J bc,t, J bp,t, W ac,t and
W ap,t. We measure the welfare cost in percentages by finding the value of ψ × 100
that solves:
nE
[W ac,t]+ (1− n) E [W ap,t] = n ((1− ψ)1−σCc (E [W bc,t]+ E [J bc,t])− E [J bc,t])
(39)
+ (1− n)
(
(1− ψ)1−σcp
(
E
[
W bp,t
]
+ E
[
J bp,t
])
− E
[
J bp,t
])
where J bi,t is an auxiliary variable defined by: J
b
c,t =
χc
1+σHc
eε
U
c,t(Hbc,t)
1+σHc + λR
(
Rbt − R¯
)2
+ βEtJ bc,t+1
J bp,t = χp1+σHp e
εUp,t(Hbp,t)
1+σHp + λR
(
Rbt − R¯
)2
+ βEtJ bp,t+1
(40)
We cannot find an analytical solution of the problem, we use Matlab solver to get
the numerical solution. In our quantitative simulations, regime a is the benchmark
reference (i.e. the estimated rule or the optimized Taylor rule) while regime b is the
model solved with a macroprudential policy.
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